Editor's note: At a seminar sponsored by China Daily last week, leading researchers on Japan studies analysed current Sino-Japanese relations and offered their opinions on how to improve and develop bilateral ties. The following are some of their thoughts:

Xu Dunxin, former Chinese ambassador to Japan:

In 1972, diplomatic relations between China and Japan became normal. The two nations went through stormy weather, but in my memory, there was nothing in the relationship that could be described as "worsening," until now that is. This shows just how serious the current situation is.

The discrepancies between the two nations are not only rooted in history, but also involve current issues. On top of that, neither side is certain about what the future holds for the other and this has led to suspicion and apprehension.

The Sino-Japanese relationship has been described as "economically warm but politically cold." In my opinion, this is not normal, and it is not something the Chinese side wants to see. We had hoped that the 60th anniversary of victory in the War of Resistance Against Japan would be an opportunity for relations to grow in a healthy and stable direction in the spirit of "learning from history and looking out to the future." But things have turned out quite different.

This year has been swarming with problems, both old and new, such as Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, distortions in history textbooks, the Taiwan question, the Diaoyu Islands and East Sea Continental Shelf and Japan's opposition to the EU's lifting of its arms embargo on China. The Sino-Japanese relationship has come to a crossroads. The problems that have emerged and evolved are by no means accidental. They are profound in that they have an international background and domestic aspect to them.

In the international context, the end of the Cold War left the United States as the world's only superpower. As the Soviet Union disintegrated, a regional threat no longer existed. The United States, to promote its global strategy, needed the help of Japan, and Japan, for its part, saw a golden opportunity to realize its dream of becoming a big power. It reaffirmed its strategy of tagging onto the United States. With this move, international laws and rules of the game, what's right and wrong, even the fundamental trust between nations, all became secondary to Japan, even downright irrelevant.

Domestically, Japan has been suffering from economic malaise, which resulted from its "bubble economy," while its neighbouring countries have been gaining economic clout. The unique position Japan has been occupying in Asia since the Meiji Restoration seems unable to be sustained or is already a thing of the past. Japan has had difficulty adjusting itself to reality and jingoism has reared its ugly head.

The changes in Japanese politics have weakened the mechanism of checks and balances and as a result its foreign policy has begun to take a hard line. In its co-operation with China, there have been frequent aberrations, which amounted to throwing a monkey wrench into the engine of China's growth.

This is by no means limited to the Sino-Japanese relationship. In its recent dealings with South Korea and Russia, Japan has also been trying those nations' patience.

Zhang Tuosheng: director of the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, China Foundation for International Strategic Studies:

With Sino-Japanese relations so strained, it is of paramount importance to analyse and understand the factors that have contributed to the current situation. This is one of the prerequisites for stabilizing and improving the relationship and propelling it forward.

Since establishing diplomatic relations in 1972, China and Japan maintained ties that were generally positive throughout the 1970s and 1980s, despite friction in the areas of anti-hegemony, history, Taiwan, the Diaoyu Islands, trade and the growth of Japan's military strength. But the ties were either propped up or tempered to a certain degree. In the 1980s, according to surveys, the positive feelings the peoples of the two nations had for each other reached their zenith.

Constant clashes started in the early 1990s. By 1995 and 1996, disagreements on issues with historical implications, Taiwan, the US-Japanese military alliance and Diaoyu Islands, reached their peak. But the end of 1996 saw the silver lining of the dark diplomatic cloud. At that point, bilateral relations moved forward, but with twists and turns. The 1990s can be summarized as "a rough uphill road with a bad middle section but bracketed by a good end."

However, since 2001, Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's insistence on visiting the Yasukuni Shrine has hurt Chinese feelings. The Chinese side suspended summit meetings and mutual visits by heads of state. Coupled with other issues such as history and Taiwan, the two countries found their relations in a state of quickening deterioration.

Looking back, it is easy to see the direct causes. There are many, but Japan's take on history is a major one, and the area where China is most dissatisfied. Other than that, there are the Taiwan issue, disputes over territorial and ocean rights and the Japan-US alliance. But these problems existed when the two countries established diplomatic relations. How is such a good beginning possible, with substantial progress made, with these issues extant, only for them to resurface now, and unleash a tide of ill will?

There is one argument that points to four major causes: Japan's perspective of history; Japan's policy on Taiwan; the conservatism of Japanese society; and Japan's reluctance to see China develop. It is interesting to combine the direct causes with underlying factors. But this leads to another question: On three of the above issues, the United States is also concerned, but how is it that the Sino-US relationship has grown so steadily in recent years, so much so that Colin Powell recently gave it high praise? This deserves a more in-depth dissection.

In my opinion, tensions in Sino-Japanese relations over the past decade have had deeper international and domestic foundations: First, the end of the Cold War, the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the change in America's policy towards China; second, the rise of China and the prolonged economic recession in Japan, which have given rise to two parallel power bases in Asia; third, the Taiwan question and the prominence of the issue; fourth, substantial shifts in Japanese politics, such as the collapse of the 1955 political dynamic and the move towards the right; and fifth, the media's hyping of bilateral tensions.

Standing out from the above are the end of the Cold War and the emergence of the parallel power bases.

However, Japan's shift from an economic power to a political and even military power seems to be inevitable. Under these circumstances, distrust and competition may be hard to avoid. The relationship went from the co-existence of co-operation and conflict in the 1990s, to a new century where antagonism has overtaken collaboration.

A full and in-depth grasp of cause and effect is necessary so that Sino-Japanese relations can be approached strategically, rather than issue by issue. This will help position the relationship in a way that will be consistent with the new international dynamic and at the same time be pragmatic. The stability of Sino-US relations, the improvement of Sino-Indian relations, and especially the new vista of cross-Straits relations, are all testaments to this argument.