The violent events in former Soviet Kyrgyzstan are very different from the Ukrainian and Georgian scenarios that many observers in Russia and the West had hoped for. Political scientist Igor Ryabov, just back from the region, talks about what—and who—is really behind the unrest in this Central Asian CIS state.

Unlike the Ukrainian scenario, Moscow has not expressed any support for any particular side in the Kyrgyz conflict. Is this because Russia has fewer interests in the region, or because the Kremlin doesn’t want to suffer another public defeat like it did when Viktor Yanukovich lost the elections?

The Kremlin, of course, doesn’t want to repeat its mistake. Ukraine was a defeat for it, and the Kremlin doesn’t want to repeat that scenario. It was a defeat for Russia’s PR, it lost to America. And it does not want to repeat such mistakes again.

The Kremlin has expressed an official line concerning the events in Kyrgyzstan: that the events should remain within the framework of the law. As for the opposition, Moscow has met with some opposition leaders in the last months. But this by no means entails any support for the opposition. Moscow is not involved in any way in what is happening in Kyrgyzstan. But of course it has interests there—like the military base it has in Kant, which was built before the U.S. air base in Menas. And, despite the fact that Kyrgyzstan has a small population, strategically it is in a very important position.

Primarily, in terms of natural resources, it has a lot of fresh water. It is positioned in such a way that you have access to China, to Afghanistan... and, of course, this is a reason why many countries are trying to establish political influence there, including Russia.

Did statements by the OSCE and officials in the United States following the parliamentary elections act as a catalyst for the uprisings?

The OSCE did not really condemn the elections, neither in the first round nor the second. It recognized the elections as valid. Of course, it noted violations in the first round and in the second, but it did not see those violations as grave enough to invalidate the elections. Mostly it was the Kyrgyz opposition that spoke out about the violations, and certain politicians in the United States. U.S. influence is very strong in Kyrgyzstan—a number of non-governmental organizations are active on its territory, and they they are financed by U.S. organizations. They are the Soros Foundation, and Freedom House. The printing press that prints opposition newspapers is actually owned by Freedom House. The head of this organization is James Woolsey, the former CIA director. And congressmen who have criticized the Kyrgyz government are in fact quite close to these power structures.

In particular, such statements were made by Senator John McCain.

Of course, tensions didn’t start to escalate right away. But three days after the first round McCain came out with some harsh critical statements, and in effect issued an ultimatum: either Akayev corrects the violations, or the country will face“consequences”. After this rather aggressive public statement, the OSCE distanced itself, and repeated that it recognized the elections as valid.

The radicalization in Jalal Abad coincided with the statements by the U.S. senator. But the people that are running about Osh and Jalal Abad with sticks and bottles are residents of very poor neighborhoods in the outskirts. Theoretically, the same thing can happen in [the capital] Bishkek. Right now, the fact that the opposition is being urged to negotiate is rather strange, because they don’t have any control over the situation. And it’s unclear where all of this may lead in the future.

Does the opposition have the mass support of the people, like the Ukrainian and Georgian opposition?

There is discontent with President Askar Akayev’s regime, in particular this is discontent with the people who surround him. All of the country’s business is practically concentrated in the hands of his son and his son-in-law. On the other hand, the opposition doesn’t really have any political resources. Virtually no one knows its leaders, even Roza Atanbayeva only appeared as a political figure at the beginning of this year. The most popular politician is in jail.

The fact that the unrest took place mainly in the south is also understandable. There was an attempt to create a sort of Maidan [Kiev’s Square of Independence where the opposition protests were centered], they even set up a tent, but police dismantled it. And so no one was successful in organizing any mass protests in Bishkek, although attempts were made. Once in a while, the opposition would rally some 150 protesters, and the protests would be shown in Moscow as if it was the start of a revolution. Russian journalists flocked to the elections and were very disappointed, because there was really nothing going on. No one really traveled to the south, and no one really understands what’s happening there. Then they return to Moscow, see the broadcasts, and then get hyped up about a revolution starting up. As far as I can see at this point, the Kyrgyz government has a pretty calm outlook about what is going on.

Did you ever get the impression that the mass protests in the south were provoked artificially? And if so, is there any proof of this?

When there is economic discontent—and compared to Russia and Kazakhstan the people in Kyrzyzstan are pretty poor off, although they are faring much better than Tajikistan—then of course you can rally up the people if you put effort into it.

And then the clan system is very strong there, and clan conflicts have resonance. So one clan pitted against another can turn into a political showdown. So one deputy who didn’t make it into parliament can just say one word to rally some 500 people. And that was what was going on. Those who provoked the events in Jalal Abad were deputies that didn’t make it into the second election. The anarchy that is happening there is first of all convenient for the narcotics trade. And it’s the narcotics party that has really won from all this. The road from Afghanistan to Russia goes through the Ferghana Valley.

How is the situation with energy resources in the country? How are Russian and U.S. companies involved?

Recently after Akayev’s [visit to the United States] an agreement was signed concerning $2 billion in investments into the country’s energy system—this including building an aluminum plant and a hydro-electric station running on fresh water that is abundant in the mountains there. Two countries—Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan—are interested in joint control over the water resources, which, of course, the government of Kyrgyzstan doesn’t want. For example, Turkmenistan has gas, Kazakhstan has oil, and Kyrgyzstan has its water. Kazakhstan considers it has full ownership of its oil, Turkmenistan owns its gas, but they both consider Kyrgyzstan’s water common property. So regional politics revolve around this issue.

Of course, somehow these problems were resolved. A couple of years ago, there were instances when electricity and gas was cut off. But now they’ve learned to agree. And now, recently, [Kazakhstan’s president Nursultan] Nazarbayev offered to create a closer union between Central Asian states that would include Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. So while the relations are calm, they are paying close attention to the events in Kyrgyzstan

What are the United States’particular interests in Kyrgyzstan? Does Akayev have any sort of relationship with Washington?

For many years, Akayev had friendly relations with both the United States and Russia, it was his particular skill to maneuver between the two. From the United States he got investments, and also money from the use of the military bases. And of course the Americans really invested a lot in building a civil society there. This network of NGO’s was being used by the U.S. as its political base. But the thing is—this whole approach towards a civil society is really an American model that is more natural in European countries. But to dig deeper—into the clan relations, for example—and you realize that the Americans just don’t understand how their society is built. That is why all these NGO’s are there to eat up money, hold seminars and don’t have anything to do with real life in the country.

For example, a“human rights activist”was recently arrested there—he was called a human rights activist because he headed one of the NGO’s. And he was arrested for provoking the violent unrest. Also, he had close ties with the U.S. ambassador Stephen Young. When the opposition lost during the first round of elections, there were rumors that Young was being relocated to Taiwan. That’s how big his status is. He is a very public figure there, he travels the country freely, and often the government doesn’t even know his given location. And now, when all this unrest developed after the second round of elections, he offered himself as a mediator between the opposition and the Kyrgyz government. The offer was pretty much ignored.

For the Americans, Kyrgyzstan is important on a geopolitical scale. This means that it neighbors China, it neighbors Afghanistan, and the United States wants a strong position in this region. How the domestic events are going to turn out after everything they’ve done there—they’re not really concerned about that. They need a government that they can control. Taking this into account, it’s not clear why they’re ruining their relations with Akayev, because he’s been loyal to them all this time. And it’s Kyrgyzstan where the U.S. has its military base.

In Kyrgyzstan the scenario of an attempted“bloodless revolution”like in Georgia and the Ukraine could lead to a Tajikistan, with civilian casualties, anarchy, and a flourishing narcotics trade. So far, it’s brought about popular governors in the south, but it’s also brought about growing prices for bread, it’s brought about cases where the electricity has been cut off, where planes don’t fly there anymore. It’s brought about an economic crisis.